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Introduction
Orange County’s bankruptcy was an historical
event. Municipal bankruptcies are
rare,
and
Orange County’s was the largest case ever. At the
time of its bankruptcy, the County was the fifth
most populous county in the United States, with
two and a half million residents. The county’s
budget exceeded $3.7 billion, and its employees
1
numbered about 18,000. Even among large municipal
bankruptcies, the case was unique. Large cases
typically involve declining urban centers, short
on tax revenues and long on spending commitments.
Orange County, by contrast, was a prosperous
suburban county, and its financial demise was
triggered by a risky investment strategy gone bad.
The
County
treasurer
oversaw
a
leveraged
investment pool that had lost $1.6 billion by the
2
time of its bankruptcy filing. In addition, the
County’s
financial
distress
had
direct
1. See MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS:
THE ORANGE COUNTY
BANKRUPTCY 7 (1998).
2. See id. Of the $20 billion in investments, $13 billion was
made with borrowed money. See id. at 90.
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consequences for many other local government
entities. The County invested not only its own
money, but funds of other municipal
entities
3
within Orange County —including cities, school
districts, sanitation and water districts, and the
4
County’s employee retirement system. The County’s
investment
woes
therefore
placed
many
other
municipal entities and their constituencies at
risk.
In addition to its financial ripple effects,
the Orange County case implicated novel legal
issues. One such issue concerns the eligibility
of municipal entities to file for bankruptcy, a
question that is determined by a mix of federal
and state law.
In particular, federal
law
requires specific state authorization in order for
a municipality to file. Federal bankruptcy law
offers
a
chapter
specifically
designed
for
municipalities in financial distress. However,
because of federal Constitutional concerns, a
municipal entity may resort to bankruptcy only
with the authorization of its state.
This federal requirement of state authorization
derives from the Constitutional principle that the
federal government may not interfere with states’
internal governance. Federal law must respect
states’
sovereignty
over
their
political
subdivisions. So while federal law offers a
municipal
bankruptcy
process,
the
state
authorization requirement leaves to each state the
final say over whether and which of its political
subdivisions may have access to this process.
5
Together with certain Bankruptcy Code provisions,
each
state’s
authorization
statute
sets
the
conditions under which its municipal entities will
be eligible for federal bankruptcy. This Article
focuses on California’s authorization provision.
The states have taken varying approaches in
managing
their
municipalities’
access
to
bankruptcy.
Some
states
provide
blanket
authorization, in effect pre-approving resort to

3. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
4. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 95.
5. See infra Part II[C].
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bankruptcy for their municipal entities without
6
qualifications or conditions. At least one state
7
flatly prohibits municipal bankruptcy
filings.
Some states impose preconditions to filing—for
example, prior approval of state officials for the
bankruptcy filing or the plan of adjustment, or
8
state appointment of a trustee. Many states have
9
no statute on municipal bankruptcy at all.
The existing California law provides fairly
broad authorization. However, the current statute
needs both technical and substantive revision.
Enacted in 1949, the statute is obsolete insofar
as it references a federal bankruptcy statute that
has been superseded. More importantly, as a
substantive matter, the broad authorization may be
inappropriate. Given the sheer number and various
different types of municipal entities that now
exist in California—from irrigation districts to
investment pools—as well as modern methods of
municipal finance, broad and indiscriminate access
to municipal bankruptcy is inadvisable. This
Article
proposes
a
reform
of
California’s
authorizing
statute
for
municipal
bankruptcy
filings.
10
Having surveyed other states’ approaches, and
having reviewed recent municipal financial crises—
including that of Orange County—I ultimately
recommend a system of discretionary access, in
which the governor holds discretionary power
to
approve, disapprove, or condition a

6. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 35-603 (2001); TEX. LOC. GOV’T
CODE § 140.001 (2002). One commentator notes that fourteen states
have enacted such blanket authorization statutes. See Daniel J.
Freyberg,
Note,
Municipal
Bankruptcy
and
Express
State
Authorization to be a Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches
to Municipal Insolvency—and What Will States Do Now?, 23 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 1001, 1008 n.66 (1997). A simple count of
authorization statutes by itself, however, may oversimplify. See
infra note 125 and accompanying text.
7. See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (2001). Iowa allows a municipal
filing only when the municipality has been rendered insolvent as
a result of a debt involuntarily incurred. See IOWA CODE §§
76.16, 76.16A (2002).
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See Freyberg, supra note 2, at 1009 and n.70.
10. The Article does not address state constitutional issues.
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municipality’s access to bankruptcy. The Article
is organized as follows. Parts I and II provide
11
background.
Part I describes the general issue
of state authorization and the interaction of
state and federal law that is required to satisfy
federal
Constitutional
concerns.
Part
II
describes municipal bankruptcy, highlighting its
salient features. In Part III, I discuss the
broad factors that should be considered in
designing a system of state authorization, and I
attempt
to
weigh
those
various
factors
in
formulating a recommendation. In Part IV, I
discuss the range of possible approaches, I
describe my proposal, and I discuss the politics
of legislating such a proposal. Part V addresses
specific questions concerning the scope of the
definition of “municipality” under the Bankruptcy
12
Code.

I. State Authorization and Federal
Constitutional Concerns
The
basic
purpose
for
federal
municipal
bankruptcy
law—Chapter
9
of
the
Bankruptcy
13
Code —is the same as for private corporations
reorganizing under Chapter 11: to allow the
debtor
a
breathing
spell
from
creditors’
collection efforts and to enable it to formulate a
14
repayment plan with creditors. However, because
municipalities and private corporations are quite
different creatures, and because of Constitutional
constraints that are implicated with municipal
bankruptcy, Chapter 9 operates very differently
from Chapter 11. In particular, a municipality
may resort to bankruptcy only with the specific
authorization
of
its
state,
but
once
in
11. Readers familiar with federal municipal bankruptcy law and
the general problem of state authorization may wish to skip
directly to Part IV.
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). This statute
is hereafter referred to as the “Bankruptcy Code.” Unless
otherwise specified, all statutory references herein shall be to
the current version of the Bankruptcy Code.
13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
14. See In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 649
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994).
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bankruptcy, the municipal debtor is subject to
many fewer constraints than its private corporate
counterpart, both in terms of operations and in
formulating and achieving court approval of a
repayment plan.
A. Federal Constitutional Concerns

Federal municipal bankruptcy law must tread a
careful line. Federal bankruptcy law provides a
municipal debtor with the power to bind a creditor
to a plan of adjustment without its consent.
While granting this power, bankruptcy law must at
the same time respect the states’ sovereign powers
over
their
municipal
entities.
Therefore,
bankruptcy
law
and
bankruptcy
courts
cannot
interfere with the governance or management of a
municipal debtor. Understanding this balancing
act
helps
to
explain
the
role
of
state
authorization in the federal scheme.
The
Constitution
empowers
Congress
“to
establish
uniform
Laws
on
the
subject
of
15
The
imprimatur
of
federal
Bankruptcies.”
bankruptcy law is critical to enabling a municipal
debtor to bind its creditors to a plan of
adjustment because the Constitution specifically
reserves
to
Congress
the
power
to
impair
contracts, and specifically prohibits to the
16
“Only federal law can give the type of
states.
15. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
16. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10. cl. 1. This Constitutional
provision has been held not to create an absolute prohibition
against state laws modifying contractual obligations in some
exigent circumstances. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of
Asbury Park, N.J., 316 U.S. 502 (1942); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933); Ropico, Inc. v. City of New
York, 425 F.Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). However, section 903 of
the Bankruptcy Code was enacted specifically to preempt state
bankruptcy laws. It provides in part: “[A]
state
law
prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of [its]
municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to
such composition.” 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (1994). The legislative
history explains:
State adjustment acts have been held to be valid, but a
bankruptcy law under which the bondholders of a municipality are
required to surrender or cancel their obligations should be
uniform throughout the States, as the bonds of almost every
municipality are widely held. Only under a Federal law should a
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17

relief afforded by chapter 9.”
Chapter 9 in effect authorizes municipalities
in financial distress to employ the federal power
to impair contracts for the purpose of effecting
municipal debt adjustments. At the same time,
however, federal law must respect the sovereign
powers guarantied to the states by the Tenth
Amendment. “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people.”18 Central to
states’ sovereignty is their power to govern the
affairs
of
their
municipalities.
Therefore,
federal law and federal bankruptcy courts cannot
attempt
to
intervene
directly
in
municipal
management or operations, a sphere that falls
squarely within the province of the respective
states.
B. The Federal Requirement of State Authorization

The current Chapter 9 is the result of a
history of Constitutional and Congressional debate
over the proper allocation of power with respect
to municipal debt adjustment. Section 109(c)(2),
requiring
specific
state
authorization
for
municipal bankruptcy filings, is a product of this
debate. It “has roots in the constitutional
principle that the federal government may not
interfere with the internal governance of a state
19
or its political subdivisions.” A municipality
may resort to federal bankruptcy law only with
proper authorization from the state.
The current version of Section 109(c)(2) was
creditor be found to accept such an adjustment without his
consent.
th
H.R. Rep. No. 2246, 79 Cong. 2d. Sess. 4 (1946). The provision
was passed in order to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in
Faitoute, 316 U.S. 502, which upheld a New Jersey statute
authorizing state adjustment plans for insolvent municipalities
to bind creditors without their consent.
17. In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 694 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1991) (citing U. S. v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938)).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
19. Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go
Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 425, 457 (1993).
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passed as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
20
1994. It requires specific state authorization
for a municipality to file for bankruptcy. In
order for a municipality to be eligible
for
Chapter 9, it must be
specifically authorized, in its capacity as a
municipality or by name, to be a debtor under
such chapter by State law, or by a governmental
officer or organization empowered by State law to
authorize such entity to be a debtor under such
chapter.21

Prior to 1994, only general state authorization
22
This
general
authorization
was
required.
provision
basically
reiterated
the
analogous
provision
from
the
bankruptcy
statute
that
preceded the current Bankruptcy Code. Section 84
of the Bankruptcy Act stated that “[a]ny State’s
political subdivision . . . which is generally
authorized to file a petition under this chapter
by the legislature . . . is
eligible
for
23
relief.”
Courts construing this general authorization
requirement reached inconsistent results. Some
construed it quite liberally, finding that it
“should
be
broadly
construed
to
provide
municipalities maximum access to Chapter 9 within
the
constitutional
limitations
of
the
Tenth
24
Amendment.” For example, one court held that
general
authority
was
inferred
from
a
municipality’s authority to sue and be sued, to
incur debts, and to negotiate contracts
that
25
Other courts were
create obligations and debts.
20. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1994).
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (1988) (repealed 1994).
23. Act of April 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260 (codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (Supp. 1976)).
24. In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal Dist., 165
B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994).
25. See In re Villages at Castle Rock Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145
B.R. 76, 82 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). One court found that general
authority
was
“sufficiently
implied
through
a
grant
of
responsibility over fiscal matters combined with a grant of
general
discretionary
powers
to
implement
the
powers
enumerated.” Id. (citing In re Villages at Castle Rock Metro.
Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 82 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)). General
authority was inferred from a municipality’s authority over its
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more restrained in finding general authority,
refusing to infer authority from a general grant
of powers. For instance, the authority of a
transit district to sue and be sued was deemed by
one court to be insufficient to infer authority to
26
file bankruptcy.
Congress responded to the confusion by amending
Section
109(c)(2)
to
require
specific
state
authorization.
C. California’s Authorization Statute:
Section 53760

Government Code

Government Code Section 53760 is California’s
current general statute authorizing municipal
bankruptcy filings. It provides:
Any taxing agency or instrumentality of this
State, as defined in Section 81 of the act of
Congress entitled ‘An act to establish a uniform
system of bankruptcy throughout the United
States,’ approved July 1, 1898, as amended, may
file the petition mentioned in Section 83 of the
Act and prosecute to completion all proceedings
permitted by Sections 81, 82, 83 and 84 of the
Act.27
own finances. See In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 693-97
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re City of Wellston, 43 B.R. 348
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984). It was inferred from broad general
powers of a municipality to be a party to suits, to borrow money,
to issue bonds, to refund any bond indebtedness, to manage,
control and supervise all of the business of district, and to
exercise all rights and powers necessary or incidental to or
implied from such powers. See In re Villages at Castle Rock
Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 82 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
General authority was inferred from a statute vesting municipal
districts with “all the powers necessary and requisite of the
accomplishment for the purpose for which such district is
created, capable of being delegated by the legislature . . . .
The district is empowered to do all acts necessary, proper or
convenient in the exercise of the powers granted herein.” In re
Pleasant View Utility Dist. , 24 B.R. 632 (Bankr M.D. Tenn. 1982)
(quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-82-306 (1980)), leave to appeal
denied, 27 B.R. 552 (M.D.Tenn. 1982).
26. See In re Westport Transit District, 165 B.R. 93, 98
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1994). See also In re Carroll Township
Authority, 119 B.R. 61 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990), in which the court
relied on Congressional legislative history to conclude that some
affirmative action by the state was required in order to
demonstrate its authorization. See id. at 63.
27. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 53760 (1999). In addition, Government Code

10

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

Another provision of the Government Code,
Section 43739, speaks specifically to bankruptcy
filings by certain cities. It states:
Any city authorized to refund its indebtedness
pursuant to this article may file a petition
under any bankruptcy law of the United States.
If the refunding of the city indebtedness is
authorized in the bankruptcy proceeding, the city
may refund its indebtedness pursuant to this
28
article.

Both provisions were enacted in 1949, when only
general state authorization was required. They
both seem to provide fairly broad authorization
for California municipal entities to file for
bankruptcy.
As I discuss below, Section 53760 should be
substantively revised to limit access based on the
governor’s discretion. As for Section 43739, it
should probably be eliminated, so that only one
general
authorizing
statute
exists
for
all
municipal entities. To the extent that particular
types
of
entities
may
require
special
considerations
in
connection
with
bankruptcy
authorization or filings, those specifics should
also be contained in one general authorizing
statute, and not scattered throughout the various
29
substantive sections of the California code.
Section
53760
also
refers
to
a
federal
bankruptcy statute that is no longer in effect.
It refers to provisions of former Chapter IX of
the Bankruptcy Act that were enacted in 1937 and
superseded
in
1976.
Because
of
potential
ambiguities that may arise from the obsolete
30
all statutory references
statutory references,
Section 53761 provides that “[t]he State consents to
the
adoption of Sections 81, 82, 83 and 84 by Congress and consents
to their application to the taxing agencies and instrumentalities
of this State.” Id. § 53761. This provision is probably
unnecessary and adds nothing to the authorization contained in
Section 53760.
28. Id. § 43739.
29. Under current law, for example, the Superintendent of
Schools must authorize the bankruptcy petition for an insolvent
school district. See infra note 150.
30. While the language appears to offer broad and explicit
authority for local agencies to file bankruptcy, the court in
Orange County specifically rejected such an argument. Instead,
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should reflect current law.
The next Part provides an
9, its operation and its
question
of
structuring
authorization regime is taken
Parts.

11

overview of Chapter
limitations.
The
a
specific
state
up in the following

II.Bankruptcy System Fundamentals
In this Part, I describe Chapter 9. I first
provide an overview of Chapter 9 and its benefits
for the municipal debtor. I then discuss Section
109(c) of the Code, which serves a gate keeping
function with respect to Chapter 9 and from which
the state authorization requirement derives.
A. Benefits of Chapter 9

For a municipality in financial distress,
Chapter 9 provides immediate relief from creditor
collection efforts and offers a framework within
which
to
negotiate
a
restructuring
of
the
municipality’s debt obligations. The immediate
relief from creditors comes in the form of a stay
against creditor collection efforts, which is
triggered automatically upon the filing of a
31
Chapter 9 petition. This relief enables the
municipality to avoid financial and operational
collapse, enabling it instead to continue to
provide public services to its residents
and
others while negotiating a plan of debt adjustment
with its creditors. While I briefly describe
other salient features of Chapter 9 as well—the
ability to deal with unfavorable contracts and the
negotiation of the plan of adjustment—I focus
particular attention on the automatic stay and
invocation of bankruptcy relief, which may have
particular relevance for the structuring of the
mechanics of state authorization.

the court decided that OCIP was neither a municipality under
federal law, nor specifically authorized under state law, because
it did not fall within the laundry list of agencies and
instrumentalities enumerated in Section 81 of the 1937 Act. See
In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1995).
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
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(1) The Automatic Stay and Invocation of Bankruptcy
Relief

As the Orange County bankruptcy illustrated,
timely invocation of the automatic stay and other
bankruptcy relief may be critical to the municipal
debtor’s
ability
to
stabilize
its
financial
position. In that case, three disputes arose
implicating the debtor’s ability to rely on the
invocation of bankruptcy to protect assets from
creditors.
While
the
debtor
was
ultimately
unsuccessful in two of these disputes, the novelty
of the legal issues raised suggests that the final
word has yet to be written on these questions. I
make no attempt to resolve these novel bankruptcy
questions, a project that is beyond the scope of
this Article. Instead, I recount these disputes
simply to illustrate the potential significance of
timely invocation of municipal bankruptcy.
Early in the case, the County hoped to rely on
the automatic stay to block certain of its secured
32
creditors from liquidating their collateral.
These secured creditors were investment banks with
which the County had entered into sophisticated
financial contracts called reverse repurchase
33
As
collateral
for
the
County’s
agreements.
obligations
under
these
reverse
repurchase
agreements, the investment bank creditors held
County-owned
securities.
Shortly
after
the
bankruptcy filing, these creditors liquidated
their collateral, despite the fact that such a
move might have been a violation of the automatic
stay. While certain Bankruptcy Code provisions
34
it is unclear
permit such creditor action,
32. See County of Orange v. Nomura Securities Int’l, Inc., Adv.
No. 94-02480 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.) (complaint dismissed).
33. A reverse repurchase agreement is essentially a secured
loan. The County borrowed money to invest in securities, using
securities it already owned as collateral for these loans. The
County was obligated to “repurchase” the collateral at a fixed
date and price, in effect retiring the loans. The interest rate
is simply built into the repurchase price. Failure to repurchase
is similar to a loan default, and entitles the other party—the
“lender”—to foreclose on the collateral. See generally PHILIPPE
JORION, BIG BETS GONE BAD: DERIVATIVES AND BANKRUPTCY IN ORANGE COUNTY 3032 (1995).
34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556, 559, 560 (permitting liquidation
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whether
these
provisions
apply
in
municipal
35
bankruptcy. The issue was ultimately mooted by
the County’s decision to liquidate its investment
pool
securities
portfolio
shortly
after
the
36
bankruptcy filing.
A second dispute over the debtor’s assets
involved the rights of holders of the County’s tax
revenue anticipation notes (TRANS) with respect to
certain pledged tax revenues. In its resolution
approving the County’s $200,000,000 borrowing via
issuance of the TRANS, the County Board of
Supervisors also pledged certain future tax and
other unrestricted revenues as security for the
37
TRANS. The resolution specified a schedule of
anticipated revenues that were to be set aside as
they were received, in order to provide the
38
However,
the
County
promised
collateral.
declared bankruptcy after only the first three
set-asides had been made, and it took the
plausible
position
that
the
invocation
of
bankruptcy cut off the TRANS holders’ rights to
39
any post-bankruptcy revenues or set-asides.
Ordinarily, a secured creditor’s prepetition
consensual lien does not extend to property
acquired by the debtor after the filing of the

of securities agreements by nondebtor party, notwithstanding
certain provisions of Code, including automatic stay provision).
35. While § 901(a) contains a laundry list of Bankruptcy Code
provisions that explicitly apply in Chapter 9, see 11 U.S.C. §
901(a), the provisions relating to liquidation of securities
agreements and similar financial contracts, see supra note 34,
are not included in the list. The National Bankruptcy Review
Commission (the “NBRC”) has recommended that these provisions
be specifically made applicable to Chapter 9 through their
inclusion in Section 901(a). See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
REVIEW COMMISSION 991 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT]. In addition,
a provision so amending Section 901(a) is included in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, which as of this writing is
pending in Congress. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, § 502,
S. 420, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 502 (2001).
36. See JORION, supra note 33, at 104.
37. See Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P. v. County of Orange (In re
County of Orange), 179 B.R. 185, 188 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995),
rev’d on other grounds and remanded by 189 B.R. 499 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 188-89.
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40

bankruptcy
petition.
Therefore,
the
prompt
invocation of bankruptcy may enable the debtor to
terminate secured creditors’ rights relating, for
example, to a stream of income or other assets,
thereby preserving unencumbered assets for the
estate, improving the debtors’ prospects for
rehabilitation,
and
enhancing
recoveries
for
general unsecured creditors.
However, while the prepetition secured creditor
is
generally
not
entitled
to
postpetition
collateral, it is unclear how this rule applies to
a municipality’s pledge of future tax revenues to
41
secure its TRANS obligations. The bankruptcy
court agreed with the County that its pledge was a
“security
interest,”
and
therefore
that
the
rights of the TRANS holders were cut off at the
42
time of the bankruptcy filing. However, the
district court reversed on appeal, finding that
the pledge constituted a statutory lien that
43
survived the bankruptcy filing. Therefore, the
lien rights of TRANS holders continued in the
County’s future revenues as originally scheduled,
and were not cut off by the bankruptcy.
A third dispute involved the Orange County
44
Investment Pool (OCIP) and the claims of its
participants, who wished to withdraw their funds
as the County and OCIP slid into financial
distress. OCIP was an investment pool started by
the then-treasurer of Orange County, Robert L.
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a).
41. This issue does not arise with respect to revenue bonds, as
to which the lien on special revenues survives the bankruptcy
filing. See id. § 928(a). The TRANS, however, were general
obligation bonds. See Alliance Capital Management, 179 B.R. at
191 n.17.
42. See Alliance Capital Mgmt., 179 B.R. at 194.
43. See Alliance Capital Mgmt., 189 B.R. at 501. The NBRC
recommends an amendment to the Code to allow similar treatment
for TRANS as the Code currently provides for revenue bonds. The
pledge of tax revenues would survive in bankruptcy, but—unlike
revenue bonds—would be subject to the municipal debtor’s use for
“necessary municipal services.” See NBRC REPORT, supra note 35,
at 999.
44. The financial chaos associated with OCIP is by now well
known. For a description of the background and state law
authorization for OCIP, see In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594,
596 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
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Citron. Under California law, certain government
entities could choose to deposit their excess
funds into the county treasury for investment by
the county treasurer. Other government entities
were required to handle their excess funds this
45
way. From these funds received by the County
treasury, Citron created OCIP by combining the
46
funds into several pools for investment purposes.
By 1994, OCIP held $7.6 billion in investments for
47
190 municipal entities.
Because it was initially unclear whether OCIP
48
could be a Chapter 9 debtor and who owned the
OCIP funds in bankruptcy, it was also unclear
whether pool participants had immediate rights to
the funds or whether the automatic stay precluded
their withdrawals. If the County held only as
trustee for the various pool participants, then
those trust funds belonged to the beneficiaries,
not the County. Under this characterization, such
funds would not have been subject to the claims of
County creditors, and the beneficiary-participants
would not have been subject to the automatic stay
with respect to these funds. The bankruptcy court
ultimately found that, despite state law creating
a trust relation between the county and the pool
investors, the funds belonged to the County as a
result of the commingling of the assets in the
49
pool. While this decision did not arise in the
automatic stay context, one of the consequences of
this ruling is that the automatic stay would have
prevented pool participants from withdrawing their
funds without County approval.
While the Orange County case highlights the
potential need for timely invocation of municipal
bankruptcy and the automatic stay, it should be
noted that Orange County’s case was unusual

45. See id.
46. See id. at 596-97.
47. See id.
48. The bankruptcy court ultimately decided that OCIP did not
qualify as a municipality under federal bankruptcy law, and was
therefore ineligible for Chapter 9. See id. at 594. See also
infra note 78 and accompanying text.
49. See County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 191 B.R.
1005, 1013 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
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insofar as it involved an investment pool. The
first and third issues described above arose only
because
of
OCIP
operations.
While
similar
investment pool-related municipal bankruptcies are
50
not out of the question, the run-of-the-mill
municipal entity does not operate a hedge fund on
the side, so the creditor collection issues will
be more straightforward. For these municipal
entities, immediate invocation of bankruptcy may
not be as critical as for private businesses or
counties running investment pools.
As a practical matter, creditors of traditional
municipal
debtors—school
districts,
hospital
districts,
and
the
like—have
relatively
few
collection devices at their disposal compared to
creditors of private entities. Aside from the
securities-related issues raised in Orange County,
municipal property is generally not subject to
creditor seizure to satisfy municipal debt. One
could easily imagine the social and political
chaos that would ensue upon the dismemberment of a
municipal entity as creditors raced to seize the
51
The primary
creditor
municipality’s assets.
remedy available upon the municipal borrower’s
default is a state court action for mandamus, by
which a court orders the municipal debtor to
exercise its taxing power to raise the revenue
52
The
necessary
to
pay
the
defaulted
debt.
automatic stay precludes further pursuit of this
remedy as well.
(2) Dealing with Unfavorable Contracts

For some municipalities, financial distress may
require adjustment of the municipality’s ongoing

50. Despite the spectacular misfortunes of OCIP, investment
pools are now a fairly common phenomenon in California municipal
finance, as cities and counties search for new revenue sources in
times of relative scarcity. Investment pools are quite different
from other more traditional municipal entities. Their operations
and obligations are different, and therefore financial distress
related to an investment pool raises issues quite different from
the issues arising out of the bankruptcy of more traditional
entities.
51. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 19, at 429.
52. See id.
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contractual obligations, as well as its debt
obligations.
Chapter 9 provides a tool for
accomplishing this, allowing a municipality to
53
reject
or
renegotiate
executory
contracts.
Obligations
to
employees
under
collective
bargaining agreements, for example, may require
54
modification, as the Orange County case and the
bankruptcy of the San Jose Unified School District
55
in 1983 illustrate.
(3) Negotiating the Plan of Adjustment

The ultimate goal for the municipal debtor in
Chapter 9 is to reach agreement with creditors
over the adjustment of municipal debts. Typical
debt adjustments include extending the maturity of
particular
debt
obligations
or
reducing
the
interest rate or principal balance. Comprehensive
adjustment is accomplished through a plan of
56
adjustment confirmed by the bankruptcy court.
Confirmation
enables
the
debtor,
with
the
57
requisite creditor majorities, to bind dissenting
minority creditors to the terms of the plan of
adjustment.
While
the
requirements
for
confirmation are numerous, the most significant
general requirements are that the plan must be
58
proposed in good faith, that all creditor classes
59
impaired under the plan must accept the plan, and
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994), which is made applicable to
Chapter 9 by 11 U.S.C. § 901(a).
54. See Orange County Employees Ass’n v. County of Orange, 179
B.R. 177, 184-85 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
55. See Barry Winograd, San Jose Revisited: A Proposal for
Negotiated Modification of Public Sector Bargaining Agreements
Rejected Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
231 (1985). One primary purpose for the ultimately unsuccessful
bankruptcy filing of the city of Bridgeport, Connecticut, was the
modification of its labor contracts. See Thomas Scheffey,
Bridgeport Bankruptcy No ‘Slam Dunk Case’: Specialists Say
Whether City Had Authority to File up in the Air in Historically
Unprecedented Scenario, THE RECORDER, June 20, 1991, at 3. See
generally W. Richard Fossey & John M. Sedor, In re Copper River
School District: Collective Bargaining and Chapter 9 Municipal
Bankruptcy, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 133 (1989).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 943.
57. See id. §§ 901(a), 1126(c).
58. See id. §§ 901(a), 1129(a)(3).
59. See id. §§ 901(a), 1129(a)(8).
A plan may also be crammed
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of

B. Debtor Control in Chapter 9

By enabling a municipal debtor to impair
contracts,
Chapter
9
affords
the
debtor
significant
leverage
over
its
creditors
in
negotiating
debt
adjustments.
Because
of
considerations of state sovereignty, however,
Chapter
9
imposes
almost
no
countervailing
restrictions
or
limitations
on
municipal
operations or asset disposition. The municipal
governance structure remains in place, free to
operate without court or creditor interference.
In effect, Chapter 9 provides the municipal debtor
with a hefty club to wield over creditors, without
giving creditors much in the way of protective
mechanisms that are available in corporate and
individual
bankruptcy.
On
the
other
hand,
municipalities’ access to Chapter 9 is much more
restricted compared to other types of debtors
filing under other chapters of the Bankruptcy
Code. Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code
serves this gate keeping function for municipal
bankruptcy. This section briefly
illustrates
debtor control in Chapter 9 by contrasting the
municipal debtor’s position with the more familiar
position of the corporate debtor under Chapter 11.
The next section then discusses gate keeping under
Section 109(c).
Unlike Chapter 11, the scope of federal court
authority over a municipal debtor is quite
limited. Sections 903 and 904 of the Bankruptcy
Code capture the limited approach of Chapter 9.
Section 903 provides: “This chapter does not
limit or impair the power of a State to control,
by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or
in such State in the exercise of the political or
governmental
powers
of
such
municipality,

down over the objection of an impaired class. See id. § 1129(b).
However, cram down in Chapter 9 works a little differently from
th
Chapter 11.
See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.03[1][f] (15 ed.
rev’d 1999).
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
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such

61

exercise.”

Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless
the debtor consents or the plan so provides, the
court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in
the case or otherwise, interfere with
(1) any of the political
or governmental
powers of the debtor;
(2) any of the property or revenues of the
debtor; or
(3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any
income-producing property.62

While particular provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code constrain the Chapter 11 debtor’s operations
and negotiating leverage with creditors, municipal
debtors suffer no analogous constraints. Unlike
the Chapter 11 debtor, the Chapter 9 debtor is
free to use its assets without interference by the
63
bankruptcy court. It need not fear that a
bankruptcy trustee will be appointed to take
64
control of operations. Its ability to borrow
65
money postbankruptcy remains unconstrained. The
debtor may employ and compensate professionals
66
without prior court approval. Creditors may not
67
place a municipality into involuntary bankruptcy.
They
cannot
force
the
municipal
debtor’s
68
liquidation. Nor are they guarantied a minimum
“liquidation value” payout under the municipal

61. Id. § 903.
62. Id. § 904.
63. See id. Compare id. § 363.
64. Compare id. § 1104. A trustee can be appointed only for
the limited purpose of pursing avoidance actions on behalf of the
estate if the debtor refuses to do so. See id § 926(a).
65. Compare id. § 364. “Only when the municipality needs
special authority, such as subordination of existing liens, or
special priority for the borrowed funds, will the court become
th
involved in the authorization.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 95 Cong.,
st
1 Sess. 394 (1977).
66. Compare id. §§ 327-331. One confirmation requirement,
however, is that “all amounts to be paid by the debtor or by any
person for services or expenses in the case or incident to the
plan have been fully disclosed and are reasonable.” Id. §
943(b)(3).
67. Compare id. § 303.
68. Compare id. § 1112.
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69

debtor’s reorganization plan. Creditors have no
right to file their own plans; only the debtor may
70
file a plan. The municipal debtor is probably
also not subject to the limitations imposed on
corporate
debtors
with
respect
to
rejecting
collective bargaining agreements or modifying
71
retiree benefits.
In all these areas, municipal debtors enjoy
more freedom from court oversight and more
leverage over their creditors than do private
business debtors in Chapter 11.
C. Gate Keeping under Section 109(c)

While municipal debtors enjoy far more leverage
over creditors in bankruptcy than their private
counterparts, access to municipal bankruptcy is
also
more
restricted.
The
specific
state
authorization requirement under Section 109(c)(2)
operates as a gate keeping device restricting
access to municipal bankruptcy, one that is
completely within the control of the various
states.
Section
109(c)
enumerates
other
eligibility requirements for Chapter 9 as well:
An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this
title if and only if such entity—
(1) is a municipality;
(2)
is
specifically
authorized,
in
its
capacity as a municipality or by name, to be

69. There is a requirement that any plan be in the “best
interests” of creditors, see id. § 943(b)(7), which in the
context of corporate bankruptcy was historically interpreted to
require that creditors receive as much under the plan as they
would have in liquidation. That requirement for corporate
bankruptcy is now reflected in Section 1129(a)(7). With a
municipality, on the other hand, liquidation is not an option, so
the best interest requirement in the Chapter 9 context cannot
refer to liquidation values. Instead, the legislative history of
Chapter 9 suggests that the test requires that creditors receive
in bankruptcy at least what they would have received by virtue of
a mandamus proceeding under state law to compel an increased tax
levy by the municipality in order to pay off the debt. See
McConnell & Picker, supra note 19, at 465-66 & n.178.
70. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 941 with id. § 1121.
71. Compare id. §§ 1113, 1114 respectively. See also Orange
County Employees Ass’n v. County of Orange, 179 B.R. 177 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1995).
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a debtor under such chapter by State law, or
by a governmental officer or organization
empowered by State law to authorize such
entity to be a debtor under such chapter;
(3) is insolvent;
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such
debts; and
(5)(A)
has
obtained
the
agreement
of
creditors holding at least a majority in
amount of the claims of each class that such
entity intends to impair under a plan in a
case under such chapter;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with
creditors and has failed to obtain the
agreement of creditors holding at least a
majority in amount of the claims of each
class that such entity intends to impair
under a plan in a case under such chapter;
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors
because such negotiation is impracticable;
or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor
may attempt to obtain a transfer that is
avoidable under section 547 of this title.

Besides these requirements, the petition must
72
have been filed in good faith. In order to
provide context for the subsequent discussion
concerning state authorization, I briefly describe
some of these other hurdles to invoking municipal
bankruptcy protection.
(1) Municipality

Only municipalities are eligible for Chapter 9.
A
municipality
is
defined
as
a
“political
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of
73
a
State.”
“Political
subdivision”
includes
74
that
counties, cities, towns, and the like,
exercise various sovereign powers such as the
taxing power, the power of eminent domain, or the
75
“Public
agency
or
police
power.

72. See id. § 921(c).
73. Id. § 101(40).
74. See In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 601 n.16 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1995).
75. See id. at 602.
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instrumentality”
includes
incorporated
authorities,
commissions,
and
similar
public
agencies
organized
for
the
purpose
of
constructing, maintaining, and operating revenueproducing enterprises. The term also includes
local improvement districts, school districts, and
the like, organized or created for the purpose of
constructing,
improving,
maintaining,
and
76
operating improvements, schools, ports, etc.
When a bankruptcy petition was filed on behalf
of OCIP, the court dismissed the petition, finding
that OCIP was neither a political subdivision nor
a public agency. As to whether it was an
instrumentality of the State, the court found that
OCIP’s characteristics and objectives did not
comport
with
those
of
entities
historically
77
identified as instrumentalities. Moreover, that
OCIP was an instrumentality of the county did not
make it an instrumentality of the State for
78
purposes of Chapter 9. This analysis has been
79
criticized.
(2) Insolvency

A municipality must be insolvent to be eligible
for Chapter 9. Insolvency in
the
municipal
context is a bit different from insolvency in the
context
of
private
entities.
A
traditional
comparison of assets and liabilities is not
useful, given difficulties of valuing municipal
76. See id. at 602-03.
77. See id.
78. See id. The court found that OCIP was unlike any of the
several types of instrumentalities enumerated in the 1937
Bankruptcy Act that was a predecessor to the current statute.
The court further held that OCIP was not specifically authorized
under California law to file for bankruptcy, since California’s
authorization provision refers specifically to this same laundry
list of instrumentalities from the superseded statute. See id.
79. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 59, at ¶ 900.02[2][a][iii].
Creditors also argued that OCIP was not an entity, and was
therefore not eligible under Section 109(c). Creditors claimed
that OCIP was merely a legal fiction created on the eve of
bankruptcy for the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition. See
County of Orange, 183 B.R. at 599. The court found, however,
that OCIP had a separate existence long before its bankruptcy,
and that it was a governmental unit, which by definition
qualifies as an “entity.” See id.
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assets and the inability of creditors to force the
liquidation of a municipality to satisfy their
debts. For municipalities, insolvency is defined
in Section 101(32)(C) to mean a “financial
condition such that the municipality is (i) not
generally paying its debts as they become due
unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide
dispute; or (ii) unable to pay its debts as they
80
become due.”
The
bankruptcy
filing
for
the
City
of
Bridgeport, Connecticut, was dismissed because the
81
court found that the debtor was not insolvent.
The court clarified that the financial inability
must be “imminent and certain, not merely a
82
This requirement
possibility or speculation.”
operates as something of a screening device to
assure that federal bankruptcy powers are not
prematurely invoked to intrude on a municipality’s
negotiation with its creditors and employees over
83
finances.
(3) Good Faith

In addition to the eligibility requirements
spelled out in Section 109(c), the Code provides
for the dismissal of any Chapter 9 petition not
84
filed in good faith. For lack of any precedent
construing this provision in Chapter 9, the Orange
County court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s good
faith test for Chapter 11 filings: “whether the
debtor is attempting to unreasonably deter and
harass its creditors or attempting to effect a
speedy, efficient reorganization on a feasible
85
In addition, “the purpose of the filing
basis.”
80. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (1994).
81. See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1991).
82. Id. at 337.
83. Moreover, this and the prerequisite that the debtor have
made at least some effort to negotiate with creditors to obtain
their consent to a plan, see supra Part II[C], give some comfort
to the municipal bond market that bankruptcy protection will not
be too readily accessible.
See 6 COLLIER, supra note 59, at
¶ 900.02[2][e].
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 921(c).
85. In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 608 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1995) (citing In re Marsch, 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994), In
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must
be
to
achieve
objectives
within
86
legitimate scope of the bankruptcy laws.”

the

* * *
Having sketched the contours of Chapter 9 and
the gate keeping function of Section 109(c), we
turn to the question of designing an appropriate
state authorization mechanism.

III.Managing Access to Chapter 9:
Principles

First

In this Part, I discuss basic considerations
that should inform the design of a state law gate
keeping
device
for
municipal
bankruptcy.
In
determining the proper role for the state in
managing access to Chapter 9, I consider, among
other
things,
competing
interests
in
local
autonomy versus statewide fiscal management, and
the politics of municipal financial distress. In
addressing the difficult trade-offs that must be
made, it may be useful to distinguish large,
multipurpose
municipal
entities—cities
and
counties—from
smaller
or
more
specialized
entities—school
or
hospital
or
irrigation
districts and the like. The former are generally
the
more
complex,
both
politically
and
economically. For the bulk of the following
discussion, cities and counties are our primary
concern. Smaller and more specialized entities
are separately considered at the end of this Part.
In the next Part, I detail my recommendation.
A. The Fundamental Tension: Statewide Impact of
Bankruptcy v. Local Autonomy

Resort to bankruptcy may have consequences not
only for the filing entity; it may also affect
borrowing
costs
for
governmental
borrowers
87
It may have other negative effects as
statewide.
re Arnold, 806 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1986)).
86. County of Orange, 183 B.R. at 608.
87. Moreover,
the
structuring
of
a
system
of
state
authorization may by itself affect borrowing costs in subtle
ways, independent of any particular municipality’s financial
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well. On the other hand, state involvement in
municipal financial affairs may infringe on local
autonomy and may hamper local efforts to address a
fiscal crisis that requires timely and finely
tuned action.
In general, preservation of local autonomy is
important. SB 349, which was passed in the 1995
legislative session but vetoed by then-governor
Wilson, would have created a Local Area Bankruptcy
Committee
(“LABC”),
composed
of
the
state
Controller, Treasurer, and Director of Finance,
that
would
decide
on
municipal
bankruptcy
88
Governor Wilson’s veto message
authorization.
concerning SB 349 expressed the sentiment that the
bill “would inappropriately vest responsibility
for local fiscal affairs at the state level,
creating an instrument of state government to
usurp the authority of local officials to decide
89
the wisdom of a bankruptcy filing.” Moreover,
official
opponents
of
SB
349
included
the
California Municipal Treasurers Association and
90
the Association of California Water Agencies.
State intervention in local affairs
should
occur only in exceptional circumstances, and not
without some specific purpose. In my
view,
however,
municipal
financial
distress
is
an
exceptional
occasion
that
begs
for
state
involvement and may justify active intervention.
Municipal financial distress generally implicates
more than merely the local interests of the
distressed
entity.
Bankruptcy
may
provide
a
municipality quick relief from certain of its debt
obligations, but the municipality—and other state
and local borrowers—will end up paying in the
financial markets. Regardless of what route is
chosen, the costs of default do not disappear.
The municipal debt markets will respond to default
by raising interest rates, not only for the
distress. For example, too liberal access to Chapter 9 may raise
overall borrowing costs by forcing the financial markets to
account
for
the
general
future
possibility of municipal
repudiation of debts.
88. See S.B. 349, 1995-96 Sess. (Cal. 1995).
89. S.B. 349 Veto (Sept. 30, 1996).
90. See S.B. 349, Senate Floor Analyses (Aug. 29, 1996).
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defaulting debtor in its attempts at future
91
borrowing, but for other municipalities in the
state, and to some extent for municipal borrowers
92
in general.
In
the
aftermath
of
the
Orange
County
bankruptcy, for instance, many California issuers
of public debt were forced to resort to letters of
credit in order to enhance the quality of their
93
issues. “We all paid a penalty for Orange
County. Orange County rocked and rolled the
market. Some governments and markets with good
reserves
still
paid
a
penalty
in
the
94
According
to
one
estimate,
marketplace.”
California
local
government
entities
issuing
short-term notes during the summer following

91. In June 1996, Orange County issued $880 million in recovery
bonds to pay its prebankruptcy creditors and exit from
bankruptcy. The bonds were priced to yield ten to twenty-five
basis points more than similarly rated bonds, which translates
into an extra $43.8 million in interest costs. Overall, the
county paid about $60 million extra to borrow, including higher
underwriting fees, higher returns to investors, and the costs of
bond insurance. See Debora Vrana, O.C. Bankruptcy All but Over,
L. A. TIMES, June 6, 1996, at A1 (quoting Zane Mann, publisher of
California Municipal Bond Advisor).
92. Default on municipal bond indebtedness may have serious
ramifications for the entire U.S. municipal bond market. General
obligation bonds, for example, are simply unsecured debt
obligations backed by the issuer’s “full faith and credit,” a
commitment that the municipality will resort to its taxing powers
if necessary to satisfy the debt. Bankruptcy signals the
issuer’s dishonor of its full faith and credit commitment, which
shakes the market’s confidence, not just with respect to the
defaulting municipality but with respect to municipal issuers
generally.
93. See Arlene Jacobious, Thanks to Improving Fiscal Picture,
L.A. County to Sell Unenhanced TRANS, THE BOND BUYER, July 17,
1997, at 1 (quoting Maureen Sicotte, director of finance and
investments for Los Angeles County).
94. Id. Some market participants expected the State of
California to step in to assure Orange County’s timely debt
repayment,
and
Orange
County’s
failure
to
reaffirm
its
obligations unequivocally may have eroded the trust between
municipal issuers and investors. See The Effect of the Orange
County Crisis on Investors and Issuers, Commission Report on
Government, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and Comment, No. 13 at
A8 (Aug. 15, 1995) (quoting Congressional testimony of Daniel
Heimowitz, Director of Public Finance Department of Moody’s
Investors Services).

April 2002]

AFTER ORANGE COUNTY

27

Orange County’s bankruptcy filing were required to
offer higher yields of fifteen to twenty-five
basis points. Together with an additional twenty
basis points for bond insurance, some of these
California government issuers paid almost an
additional
half
percentage
point
for
their
borrowings.
For
an
expected
$7
billion
in
aggregate seasonal note borrowings, the extra
interest
cost
would
run
about
$15
million
95
annually.
The
California
legislature
recognized
the
statewide implications of municipal default in
enacting financial control provisions for Orange
County in SB 1276:
It is in the interest of the state and all public
debt issuers within the state to enable the
County of Orange to finance an acceptable plan of
adjustment in order to improve the credit
standing of California public debt issuers and to
preserve and protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the residents of the county and the
state. To that end, successfully resolving the
county bankruptcy and restoring the financial
position of county government is a matter of
statewide interest and concern.96

Moreover,
the
effects
of
a
significant
municipal default may be felt nationwide. The
Orange County bankruptcy filing caused a run on
97
the Texas Investment Pool. It apparently also
raised
municipal
borrowing
costs
in
Maine,
98
according to the state treasurer.
Financial
markets
harbor
some
implicit
expectation that the state will stand behind a
defaulting municipality’s bond obligations. This
is understandable, given that state governments
have always come to the aid of their distressed
municipalities.
While a local government may fall from fiscal
grace, the perceived wisdom is that the state
95. See John E. Petersen, A Guide to the Municipal Bond Market:
The Post-Orange County Era, GOVERNING (Nov. 1995).
96. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 30400 (1999).
97. See JORION, supra note 33, at 74.
98. See Municipal Markets Lobby for Change; The Trouble with
Chapter 9, 28 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and Comment, No. 22, at
A1 (May 5, 1996).
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will step in to clean up the mess. In almost all
cases involving general units of government and
tax-supported debt, that has been the case. New
York City, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Bridgeport,
even little Chelsea in Massachusetts, were thrown
a lifeline by the state. Their respective states
swam through the often shark-infested waters of
politics to effect a rescue. Not since the
default of Detroit in the 1930s had a state
failed to intervene to head off a default or
bankruptcy by a major local government.99

In California especially, expectations of state
intervention seem reasonable, as the state budget
are all
and
the budgets of its counties
interrelated.
Beginning with Proposition 13 in
1978, when taxing and spending restrictions were
placed on state and local governments, counties
have become highlydependent on the state to provide
100
the necessary funding for local services. Because
municipal bankruptcy is not “free,” resort
to Chapter 9 should not be done casually.
statewide
Moreover, because of the possible
spillover effects, local
autonomy concerns must
statewide
fiscal
concerns, and
give way to
objections to state involvement in the decision
Chapter
9
should
be
whether to resort to
discounted. Bankruptcy of a major municipality
will almost certainly raise borrowing costs for
other California municipalities and the state, and
the bankruptcy process itself is expensive. These
suggest
that the
potential spillover effects
decision to declare bankruptcy should not be left
to the sole discretion of any municipality. In
the context of considering
reforms to federal
bankruptcy law, a working group
report ofthe
National Bankruptcy Review Commission asserted:
It is simply “wrong” to allow a financially
troubled municipality, whose problems reach and
affect
not
only
its
own
citizens
and
constituencies but affect others throughout the
99. Petersen, supra note 95. See also BALDASSARE, supra note 1,
at 86 (1998). “In every other major credit crisis in government
in the last 25 years, states have taken a lead role. . . .
There is an implied moral obligation of states to help their
municipalities.” Id., quoting Sally Hofmeister, Bankruptcy
Peculiar to California, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1995, at D1.
100. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 86.
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state, to unilaterally seek relief under the
bankruptcy laws without prior authorization from
the state within which it operates.101

Given that the costs of default will be borne
by the state as a whole, and given the connection
between state allocations and local budgets, the
state government should have the opportunity to
consider whether bankruptcy is the best approach
to the problem. While bankruptcy might be the
best of a number of unattractive alternatives, and
perhaps the costs of municipal default should be
spread
throughout
the
state
under
some
circumstances, that decision is essentially a
political one that implicates the entire state. A
distressed municipality should not be authorized
to decide the question unilaterally. For similar
reasons,
conditions
imposed
on
a
filing
municipality should not be inhibited by home rule
concerns when a fiscal crisis will have statewide
impact. Trusteeship provisions were ultimately
enacted in connection with the Orange County
bankruptcy, and my proposal incorporates the
102
possibility of similar mechanisms.
B. The Politics and Economics of State Involvement

Resolution of a serious crisis will often
require some kind of eventual state involvement.
As an historical matter, state governments have
always come to the aid of large cities in
103
Especially
in
California,
where
distress.
municipalities are restricted in their ability to
raise taxes even in the face of financial crisis,
the state may be the only possible source of the
104
necessary financing.
However, in California, given the absence of a
comprehensive framework for state involvement,

101. See Commission Report on Government, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(LRP), News and Comment, No. 8 (Aug. 13, 1996) (quoting National
Bankruptcy
Review
Commission report
of Working Group on
Government as Creditor or Debtor).
102. See infra Part IV[B][4].
103. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
104. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 26. Orange County voters
overwhelmingly rejected a proposed half-cent sales tax increase
to fund the County’s bankruptcy recovery. See id. at 160.
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political and economic dynamics may impede timely
joint action by state and local officials. Local
officials
may
prefer
not
to
involve
state
officials unless and until it is absolutely
unavoidable, and state officials may be reluctant
to get involved as well. These predilections are
understandable. Local officials might fear that
state involvement would hamper local action and
cause negative publicity. And negative publicity
might hurt the municipal entity’s restructuring
efforts,
as
well
as
creating
political
embarrassment to the local officials. For their
part, state officials may likewise be reluctant to
get involved. Not only will they not have the
intimate familiarity with local issues and local
history that municipal officials have, but state
officials may also fear getting tarred with the
political
fallout
from
the
crisis
if
they
intervene too early or too aggressively.
In terms of a state authorization regime, the
current system of blanket authorization to file
bankruptcy
may
be
a
politically
attractive
arrangement. Local officials do not have to give
up any control to state officers. Local officials
will be certain that a bankruptcy “out” is
available if necessary. State officials enjoy
insulation from any negative fallout from the
local crisis, and no immediate state budgetary
issues are implicated. No special appropriation
need be made to resolve the crisis.
State
officials can simply wait and see. Moreover, the
short-term financial costs imposed as a result of
the municipal filing are largely invisible from a
budgetary standpoint. Those costs come in the
form of higher borrowing costs for other municipal
issuers, a consequence for which no state official
need be blamed.
The political dynamics suggest that, absent
some specific incentive to do otherwise, state and
local officials may join forces too late, rather
than too early. But in general, it may be
preferable to err on the side of early state
involvement. State
participation assures that
statewide
interests
are
considered
in
the
formulation and execution of a strategy for
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addressing the crisis, and early involvement may
serve to avoid some of the costs of distress.
Moreover,
bankruptcy
need
not
necessarily
precede
a
comprehensive
plan
of
debt
105
restructuring.
It may be that state involvement
could help avoid the need for a bankruptcy filing,
thereby minimizing the fallout from a default.
State involvement could pave the way for whatever
state approvals—executive or legislative—may be
required to implement a restructuring outside of
bankruptcy. An emergency appropriation or state
credit could help to contain a crisis, while
setting
certain
terms
and
conditions
for
restructuring. For example, when New York City
encountered fiscal problems in 1975, the state
intervened. It created agencies to guaranty the
city’s loans, while imposing fiscal controls on
106
New York and other states,
city government.
anticipating municipal financial distress, have
enacted
comprehensive
mechanisms
for
state
intervention.
These
mechanisms
generally
incorporate
the
possibility
of
a
bankruptcy
107
filing, but do not depend on it.
Any plan for resolution of fiscal crisis will
have to address the concerns of creditors,
residents,
and
possibly
employees.
Whatever
arrangement is reached among the municipality and
these various constituencies will require state
involvement. But no deal will be cut without some
mechanism to hold everyone’s feet to the fire.
Bankruptcy could be that mechanism—as it was in
Orange County—but it might not have to be.
Prebankruptcy state intervention should at least
be considered. Bankruptcy may be politically
palatable in the short run, but it is an expensive
105. Indeed, Section 109(c) contemplates that a municipality may
already have negotiated a plan satisfactory to the majority of
its creditors by the time it files for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(c)(5)(A) (1994). Chapter 9 would then simply be used to
impose the plan over the objection of any minority dissenting
creditors.
106. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 11. This is not to suggest
that the nature of New York City’s fiscal problems were similar
to Orange County’s. However, in these cases and others, state
involvement is almost always required.
107. See infra Part IV.
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mechanism in terms of both direct and indirect
costs, and these costs are distributed haphazardly
108
through the workings of the bond markets.
Moreover, a bankruptcy filing may be interpreted
as the municipality’s repudiation of its full
faith and credit commitment to its bondholders—
its commitment to resort to its taxing powers if
109
necessary to satisfy its debt.
A
discretionary
bankruptcy
authorization
mechanism requiring approval of state officials
would
encourage
early
interaction.
Local
officials,
anticipating
the
possibility
of
financial distress, would wish to explore the
bankruptcy option. But to do that, they would
have
to
consult
with
the
state
officials
responsible for authorizing the bankruptcy filing.
That is, they would have to involve state
officials in their bankruptcy planning. State
officials, knowing they might have to decide
whether to authorize a bankruptcy filing, would
hopefully take an active role in addressing the
problem upfront. Placing this responsibility on
state officials encourages and requires them to
focus on the crisis early and to consider its
statewide implications. Such implications may be
significant—as
in
Orange
County—or
insignificant. A hands-off approach at the state
level may or may not be appropriate in given
cases. But simple inertia should not be the
reason for a lack of proactive state involvement.
Throughout
the
Orange
County
crisis,
the
governor and other state officials had apparently
been kept well informed by county officials.
However, the state took no action—formal or
informal—until after bankruptcy was filed in
December 1994, even though signs of financial
demise were readily apparent months before the
filing. The Orange County treasurer’s race in the
spring of 1994 called attention to the high risk
of the OCIP portfolio. John Moorlach, challenger
108. After
municipal
bankruptcy
and
default,
the
next
municipality interested in floating a bond issue will suffer
higher interest rates in the market, or will simply do without
the financing.
109. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 119.
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to the incumbent treasurer Robert Citron, warned
in May 1994 that OCIP had already lost $1.2
billion because of interest rate hikes by the
Federal Reserve that had begun in February. His
dire predictions were discounted to some extent as
mere political attack on the incumbent. However,
by mid-November, outside auditors retained by the
county confirmed a $1.5 billion loss. When the
county could not convince its investment bankers
not to foreclose on their collateral for the
county’s reverse repurchase agreements, the county
110
filed for bankruptcy on December 6, 1994.
Even after the filing, the state made no
official move to intervene. Instead, there was
mutual finger pointing between state and county
officials as to who should bear blame for their
111
failure to work together to avoid the bankruptcy.
Unofficially, Governor Wilson convinced a former
member of his administration, Tom Hayes, to step
in to manage OCIP shortly after the bankruptcy
112
The governor’s ties to Orange County
filing.
presumably helped to pave the way for Hayes’
appointment by the county Board of Supervisors.
“The governor had accomplished a new kind of
‘state intervention.’ The county government had
retained the former state treasurer as the
113
overseer of the failed investment fund.”
It was only after the county had declared
bankruptcy and defaulted on bond obligations,
county taxpayers rejected a proposed half-cent
sales tax increase, and the county worked out
settlement
terms
with
investment
pool
participants,
that
the
legislature
acted
in
furtherance of a comprehensive resolution of the
114
While it is unclear, given the politics
crisis.
of the situation and the complexity of the legal
issues
involved,
whether
a
comprehensive
settlement could have been accomplished without

110. See id. at 175.
111. See id. at 121.
112. Hayes had been state treasurer and state auditor-general
under Wilson. See JORION, supra note 33, at 78.
113. BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 122.
114. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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115

resort to bankruptcy, in other cases, bankruptcy
and default may be avoidable—or their impact
lessened—if the financial expertise and resources
of the state are made available early on.
C. Miscellaneous Issues
(1) Moral Hazard

In designing a framework to manage access to
municipal bankruptcy, we should consider not only
the question of how best to handle an imminent
financial crisis. We should also consider how
best to avoid crises and to address their impact
at the earliest possible point. Some crises are
of course unavoidable. However, to the extent
that bankruptcy is or is perceived to
be
a
“safety valve” for municipal entities, the safety
valve should not be made too easily available.
Requiring approval of state officials means
that municipal access to bankruptcy protection is
never certain. Moreover, the prospect of state
involvement may mean a curtailing of local
autonomy, with possible political costs to local
officials. Therefore, at the margin, municipal
officials have some incentive to steer a more
conservative fiscal course than they might if
116
bankruptcy were always a ready alternative.
Assuming that local officials do not relish
involvement of state officials in local affairs, a
state approval requirement and the prospect of
further
state
involvement
provide
additional
incentive to avoid financial distress.
(2) Confidentiality

Confidentiality may also matter in the early
stages of a financial crisis. A municipality will
wish to avoid panicking residents and employees,

115. Experts and observers disagree as to whether a bankruptcy
filing was necessary. See 28 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (LRP), News and
Comment, No. 9, at A1 (February 6, 1996).
116. This is not to say that municipal officials do not already
have significant political and other constraints that demand
their fiscal vigilance. However, uncertainty as to bankruptcy
access may also influence local fiscal decisions.
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and one whose bonds are publicly traded will wish
to avoid roiling the markets. Introducing state
officials
into
the
mix
may
create
some
confidentiality
risks.
Any
bankruptcy
authorization mechanism should be structured to
avoid or at least minimize this risk.
(3) Smaller or Specialized Entities

Problems of statewide financial impact will be
greatest,
of
course,
with
the
large
municipalities—large
cities
and
counties.
Financial distress for smaller municipal entities
may not raise these same concerns. However, for
these smaller entities, resort to Chapter 9 may be
ill advised for other reasons. Certain types of
municipal entities may not be ideal candidates for
bankruptcy, not because of any widespread impact
of their financial demise or any effect on
financial
markets.
Instead,
for
some
municipalities, the complexity and expense of
municipal bankruptcy may make it a poor device for
handling financial crisis. In the Orange County
case,
for
example,
fees
for
the
county’s
bankruptcy
attorneys
and
other
professionals
totaled about $50 million by the end of the case.
This figure does not include the costs of the
county’s postbankruptcy lawsuits or professional
117
fees for OCIP participants. For a small pest
control district or sewage district, resort to
bankruptcy may generate more costs than it saves.
For smaller entities, the bankruptcy process may
not be cost-justified.
Distinguishing among the multifarious municipal
entities that exist in California in terms of
their suitability for Chapter 9 is another reason
for
limiting
access
at
state
officials’
discretion.
Crafting a workable system of state involvement
is hardly a simple affair. Political deadlock
might possibly thwart a timely response to fiscal
crisis. However, if managed properly, as described
below, state involvement need not hinder or delay
financial
restructuring,
and
may
in
fact
117. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 180.
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facilitate
it.
Operational
issues
like
timeliness,
predictability,
flexibility,
and
interests in minimizing threshold litigation are
discussed below in the context of my basic
framework for discretionary access.

IV.Structuring the Appropriate System
In this Part, I describe my proposal, which
places with the governor the discretion to
authorize
municipal
bankruptcy
filings.
As
prologue,
I
survey
the
range
of
plausible
approaches to structuring a state authorization
mechanism, discussing the general advantages and
drawbacks to each basic approach. I then outline
my proposal and explain how it attempts to resolve
the various tensions.
A. Municipal Bankruptcy Authorization:
Approaches

the Range of

In
this
section,
I
consider
plausible
approaches to structuring a state authorization
mechanism for municipal bankruptcy. Other states’
approaches, as well as the bills introduced in the
California legislature in the aftermath of the
Orange County bankruptcy, give some flavor of the
range of available alternatives. Approaches range
from blanket, unqualified authorization for all of
a
state’s
municipal
entities
to
express
prohibition across the board. In the middle are
proposals requiring straightforward prior approval
or some exercise of discretion by state officials.
Some
states
have
also
devised
elaborate
nonbankruptcy approaches to municipal financial
distress, sometimes including bankruptcy as an
118
These approaches may lead to outright
option.
takeover of a distressed municipal entity by a
state government.

118. See DEP’T OF PUB. ADMIN., COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS IN
PENNSYLVANIA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A PROGRAM EVALUATION OF ACT 47 app. 4
(PA State Univ. Graduate Sch. of Pub. Pol’y & Admin. 1991)
[hereinafter COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS] (summarizing municipal
distress statutes of Florida, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Nevada,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Ohio).
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(1) Blanket Authorization

A dozen or so states authorize
unfettered
access to municipal bankruptcy for some or all of
119
Blanket authorization
their municipal entities.
for all municipal entities otherwise
eligible
under federal law has the virtues of simplicity
and definiteness. This approach provides the
municipality with maximum flexibility in dealing
with its financial distress and negotiating with
creditors.
It
reduces
the
likelihood
of
bankruptcy court litigation over the scope of
120
It would appear to
state law authorization.
enable a timely filing, once the municipality has
decided to enter bankruptcy.
However, these apparent advantages and their
apparent popularity with some states should not be
overstated.
Even
assuming
clear
state
authorization, litigation may arise with respect
to the other federal gate keeping requirements of
Section 109(c)—for example, whether the entity
qualifies as a municipality or whether it is
121
insolvent. Therefore, some amount of uncertainty
will always exist as to a municipality’s ready
access to Chapter 9.
Even assuming that a blanket authorization
provision
could
provide
definiteness
and
flexibility to a municipality in distress, it has
one fundamental shortcoming insofar as it ignores
the possible statewide financial impact of a
municipal filing. By providing blanket access to
Chapter 9 without some explicit mechanism for
state
intervention,
the
state
foregoes
its
119. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. California’s
existing authorization statute, Section 53760 of the Government
Code, would appear to offer broad authorization as well. Though
outdated with respect to its references to federal bankruptcy
law, the statute essentially authorizes to any
California
“taxing agency or instrumentality” to file bankruptcy. See
supra note 27 and accompanying text. However, the Orange County
court found that the statute was not broad enough to cover OCIP.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
120. Recall the litigation that occurred under the predecessor
provision to current § 109(c)(2), which required only general
state authorization for a municipality to file bankruptcy. See
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
121. See supra Part II[C].
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opportunity and responsibility to act to minimize
the
possible
statewide
costs
of
financial
distress, which will be borne indirectly by other
122
municipalities and the state as a whole.
Like California, some states enacted blanket
authorization provisions decades ago and never
revised them. Washington State, for instance,
authorizes “any taxing district” to “file the
petition mentioned in section 80 of chapter IX of
123
This is the same
the federal bankruptcy act.”
obsolete
reference
found
in
California’s
authorizing provision. The Washington statute was
124
enacted in 1935. Given that the vast majority of
municipal filings have historically involved small
special
purpose
entities—irrigation
districts,
school districts, and the like—and that the
bankruptcy of a city or county is extremely rare,
it
is
not
surprising
that
states
enacting
authorization provisions fifty or sixty years ago
would have failed to consider possible statewide
ramifications from bankruptcy filings by cities
125
and counties.
122. See supra Part II[A].
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.64.040 (1999).
124. See id.
125. Moreover,
what
initially
appear
to
be
“blanket”
authorization provisions sometimes turn out to be more limited in
scope. For example, Florida’s authorization statute would appear
to provide blanket authorization for all its municipal entities.
It states:
For the purpose of rendering effective the privilege and
benefits of any amendments to the bankruptcy laws of the
United States that may be enacted for the relief of
municipalities,
taxing
districts
and
political
subdivisions, the state represented by its legislative
body gives its assent to, and accepts the provisions of
any such bankruptcy laws that may be enacted by the
Congress of the United States for the benefit and relief
of
municipalities,
taxing
districts
and
political
subdivisions
and
its
several
municipalities,
taxing
districts and political subdivisions, at the discretion of
the governing authorities thereof, may institute and
conduct and carry out, by any appropriate bankruptcy
procedure that may be enacted into the laws of the United
States for the purpose of conferring upon municipalities,
taxing districts and political subdivisions, relief by
proceedings in bankruptcy in the federal courts.
FLA. STAT. § 218.01 (1999).
However, Florida law also provides
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(2) Blanket Prohibition

Like blanket authorization, blanket prohibition
of all municipal entities from filing bankruptcy
has the advantages of simplicity and definiteness.
There will be no litigation over municipal access
to Chapter 9. However, this approach obviously
makes unavailable what might be a useful tool for
financial crisis management. It is quite a blunt
approach,
effectively
predetermining
that
a
Chapter 9 filing will never be appropriate for any
municipal entity in the state.
At the least, the state would have to provide
some other mechanism for addressing municipal
financial crisis. But state law approaches may
have
shortcomings
because
of
federal
Constitutional
limitations
on
impairment
of
126
Blanket prohibition is probably too
contracts.
blunt and is not recommended.
Only Georgia
127
expressly prohibits all resort to Chapter 9.
(3) Limited Nondiscretionary Access

A middle path between blanket authorization and
blanket prohibition would be to create categories
of municipal entities that would have varying
standards for bankruptcy
authorization.
Some
might be granted unconditional authority to file;
others
would
have
conditional
authority
for
bankruptcy; and still others would be prohibited.
Given the multifarious types of municipal entities
that exist in California, it might be possible to
distinguish particular types of entities that
should or should not have access to bankruptcy.
for active intervention by the governor in case of financial
emergency, which is triggered upon the occurrence of any of
several specific financial or other defaults. During the period
of financial emergency, the municipal entity may not seek
bankruptcy protection without the governor’s approval. See id. §
218.503(4).
The
governor
also
has
significant
oversight
authority over the local entity and may appoint a financial
oversight board. See id. § 218.503(3). It is unlikely that a
municipality would be a candidate for bankruptcy without already
having triggered a financial emergency. Therefore, as
a
practical matter, the blanket authorization provision may never
matter.
126. See supra Part I[A].
127. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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General purpose political subdivisions—cities and
counties—are distinguishable from special purpose
entities—irrigation, hospital, and pest control
districts. The statewide political and economic
ramifications
of
financial
distress
would
generally be more drastic with the former than the
latter. The latter are more likely to be smaller,
with smaller budgets and fewer constituents that
might be affected by an entity’s financial
distress.
This “pre-defined access” approach has merit
insofar as it offers the prospect of separate,
somewhat tailored solutions for different types of
municipalities.
This
might
provide
some
definiteness and predictability for particular
municipal
entities,
financial
markets,
and
creditors, as compared to a wholly discretionary
system. By drawing lines ahead of time, this
approach
might
avoid
the
politicization
and
confusion that could occur in attempting to
exercise discretionary authority in the charged
context of a particular crisis.
On the other hand, this approach may suffer the
risk of rapid obsolescence. Times change faster
than statutes do, as the current authorization
provision illustrates. New types of municipal
entities may arise. Witness the Orange County
Investment Pool. New types of financing are
possible. It may be too much to hope that a
statute of this type would maintain its relevance
without constant revision, a fairly unattractive
prospect.
Moreover,
even
adopting
a
line
drawing
approach, it is not altogether clear where to draw
the lines or even what the appropriate
line
drawing criteria should be. Even distinguishing
general purpose entities from special purpose
districts as proposed above does not give us clear
direction as to which
group—if
either—should
have more ready access to Chapter 9. As discussed
earlier, limiting access for cities and counties
is justified because of the statewide implications
of a filing and the necessary involvement of state

April 2002]

AFTER ORANGE COUNTY

41
128

officials in structuring a comprehensive fix. By
contrast, limiting access for smaller special
purpose entities makes sense because bankruptcy
might not be a cost effective way to resolve their
fiscal woes.
A pest control district,
for
example, might not possess the financial, legal,
or other expertise necessary to use bankruptcy
effectively, or even to decide whether bankruptcy
129
In addition, municipalities of
would be useful.
the same type may have vastly different fiscal
problems. One county, for example, may suffer
from a progressively shrinking tax base and a
daunting payroll burden, while another risks
financial default because of poor investment
decisions. In either case, whether and when to
allow resort to bankruptcy is difficult to decide
in the abstract.
In my research, I did not come across any state
with a coherent or comprehensive system for
categorizing municipal entities for purposes of
bankruptcy access. Some states have particular
authorizing statutes for particular types of
entities, but these appear to have been enacted on
an ad hoc basis for the specific types of
municipal entities addressed, and not in any
comprehensive way. For example, Colorado has
separate authorizing provisions for irrigation and
130
131
but
drainage districts and special districts,
132
no statute of general application. As a result,
authorization statutes for particular entities may
be scattered throughout a state’s general laws.

128. See supra Part III[A].
129. See supra Part III[C].
130. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-32-102 (1999).
131. See id. § 32-1-1403.
132. The reason for this lack of a general statute in Colorado
and other states may be that before 1994, federal bankruptcy law
did not require specific state authorization but only general
authorization. Many courts were willing to infer general
authorization quite readily. See cases cited supra notes 24-25.
States may therefore have assumed that for general purpose
municipalities, explicit statutory authorization was unnecessary,
and they have not gotten around to amending their statutes
following the 1994 bankruptcy amendment requiring specific
authorization.
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B. A Proposal for Discretionary Access

The basic premise of my proposal is that the
governor must authorize any municipal bankruptcy
filing. The governor should also have
wide
latitude to attach conditions to the bankruptcy
authorization. In terms of setting conditions,
the governor should have a short menu of welldefined options at his disposal, including the
possible appointment of a trustee to manage the
municipal entity through its financial crisis.
My
approach
attempts
to
encourage
and
facilitate cooperation between the state and the
distressed municipality. Rather than empowering
the governor to dictate terms to a municipality in
trouble, it will encourage early communication
between the two and a negotiated resolution of any
financial crisis. This section describes the
structure and scope of the discretionary system.
The
next
section
explains
the
anticipated
negotiation dynamics.
(1) Other State Models

Several
states
have
similar
discretionary
systems.
Connecticut
requires
the
governor’s
133
consent.
In addition, if
he
consents,
the
governor must report to the State Treasurer and
the General Assembly to explain the basis for this
134
North Carolina requires preapproval by
decision.
135
a
nine-member
a Local Government Commission,
commission that forms a division within the state
treasurer’s department. The Commission comprises
the state treasurer, the state auditor, the
secretary of state, the secretary of revenue, and

133. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-566 (1999).
134. See id. This provision was enacted in the wake of the
controversy over the city of Bridgeport’s attempt to file
bankruptcy over the objection of the state of Connecticut, which
claimed that Bridgeport was not authorized to file under state
law. See In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688 (Bankr. W.D.
Conn. 1991). That case arose under former Section 109(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which required only general state authorization
to file. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
135. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48 (1999). This provision, enacted
in 1939, is a bit outdated. It refers to creditor approval
issues from a 1937 federal bankruptcy statute. See id.
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136

five appointees.
In New Jersey, a Municipal Finance Commission
137
must approve both the filing of the petition and
138
These provisions are
any plan of adjustment.
part of a general state intervention scheme. Once
a municipality has been in financial default to
bondholders or noteholders for more than sixty
days, the Commission may intervene to manage the
139
Other
financial affairs of the municipality.
states have similar comprehensive schemes for
assertion of state control over municipalities in
distress. Typically the body designated by the
state to oversee or manage the municipality also
has power to authorize or even initiate a
140
bankruptcy filing.
Pennsylvania has two separate systems for
141
cities in distress—one for its largest cities
142
and one for smaller cities and towns.
The
Pennsylvania
Intergovernmental
Cooperation
Authority is a state agency charged with providing
technical and financial assistance to large cities
143
in distress. Among other things, the Authority
may issue bonds and extend loans to the “assisted
city.” While this system is quite elaborate,
several details are worth noting. First, neither

136. See id. § 159-3.
137. See N.J. STAT. § 52:27-40 (1999).
138. See id. § 52:27-42.
139. See id. § 52:27-2. The Commission is in the Division of
Local Government within the Department of the Treasury. See id.
§ 52:18A-20.
140. See Freyberg, supra note 6, at 1011.
141. The Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperative Authority
Act (“Act 6”) was passed in 1991. See 53 PA. STAT. §§
12720.101-.709 (1999). It applies only for “cities of the first
class,” which are those with populations exceeding one million.
See id. § 101. At the time of enactment of Act 6, Philadelphia
was the only first class city in the state. See Comment, Drew
Patrick Gannon, An Analysis of Pennsylvania’s Legislative
Programs for Financially Distressed Municipalities and the
Reaction of Municipal Labor Unions, 98 DICK. L. REV. 281, 292
(1994).
142. The Municipal Financial Recovery Act (“Act 47”)
was
enacted in 1987. See id. §§ 11701.101-.501. It was designed
specifically to address the fiscal crises of dying steel towns in
western Pennsylvania. See Gannon, supra note 141.
143. See 53 PA. STAT. § 12720.203 (1999).
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the Authority nor the assisted city may file for
bankruptcy as long as the Authority has bonds
144
Second, the governor must approve
outstanding.
any
bankruptcy
petition
and
the
plan
of
adjustment, which must be submitted for the
145
governor’s approval along with the petition. For
certain other municipal entities, the Department
of Internal Affairs must authorize the bankruptcy
146
filing and approve the plan of adjustment.
(2) Why the Governor?

Given the need for early state involvement in
municipal
financial
distress
situations,
the
governor’s office is probably the best place to
begin that cooperative process. The governor is
the chief executive of the state, and his office
may be best situated to bring expertise and
resources to bear on the problem and to initiate
any legislative or executive action that may be
necessary.
Placing
responsibility
for
the
decision
with
the
governor’s
office
also
eliminates any ambiguity concerning who at the
state level is “responsible” for authorizing the
bankruptcy filing. This has both political and
practical administrative benefits.
Having only one state official making the
authorization decision assures that that official
bears the entire responsibility—that is, receives
all the credit or blame—for a good or
bad
147
That political clarity
decision or strategy.
will
encourage
the
full
attention
of
the
144. See id. § 12720.211(A).
145. See id. § 12720.211(B), (C).
146. See id. § 5571. Pennsylvania’s model of state intervention
may be particularly instructive insofar as it has actually gotten
some use. In 1992, the city of Scranton, the fifth largest in
the state, became the tenth municipality to seek refuge under
Pennsylvania’s Financially Distressed Municipalities Act of 1987.
See Michael deCourcy Hinds, A Campaign to Pull Scranton Back from
Disaster, N. Y. TIMES, July 21, 1992, at A12.
147. My preference for the governor is not a strong one. I am
more concerned that one senior state official be responsible for
exercising the discretionary power to authorize municipal
filings. The state treasurer might be an equally appropriate
state officer. For the following discussion, however, I will
assume that the governor is the designated officer.
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governor’s office to the crisis. Any inclination
to head for the sidelines, to try to sidestep the
likely political fallout from the crisis, would be
untenable. As the sole gatekeeper regarding any
possible bankruptcy strategy, the governor and his
office would have no choice but to become
involved. This clear delineation of authority
also assures that if necessary, prompt action is
possible. In case exigent circumstances require
an immediate decision concerning a bankruptcy
filing, the governor can provide the necessary
authorization. By contrast, a committee structure
or
legislative
approach
might
include
more
procedural baggage, which always creates the
possibility of gridlock or other delay.
In my view, affirmative authorization should
always be required. That is, the authorization
statute should not permit or create the potential
for authorization by default as a result of the
governor’s failure to act on
an
application.
Among other things, SB 349 provided that any
request for authorization would be considered
approved after five days unless the LABC responded
otherwise.
However,
that
kind
of
“pocket
approval” is exactly the sort of mechanism that
attenuates
political
accountability
and
facilitates inaction at the state level. It
leaves the municipality to its own devices without
148
any active involvement by state officials.
The
point
of
not
allowing
for
passive
authorization
is
to
improve
political
accountability by assuring that state officials
must do something, as opposed to doing nothing, in
the face of a municipal crisis. Eliminating the
possibility of passive state authorization forces
the
governor
to
act,
either
by
explicitly
acquiescing to the request for authorization or
coming
up
with
an
alternative.
It
also
148. In addition, there is always the issue of what should be
the appropriate amount of time within which the authorizing body
or person must respond before a decision is made by default. Too
long a period might hamper timely action by the distressed
municipality. Too short a period might force
uninformed
decisions by state officials vested with the discretionary
authority.
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underscores the point that a municipal filing is
more than simply a local matter, and as such
demands the attention and action of the governor
and other state officials.
Local officials might balk at the possibility
that the governor’s inaction might delay a
bankruptcy
filing
indefinitely. However, this
theoretical possibility should not create a basis
for objection. Given the statewide financial
impact of a bankruptcy filing, no municipal entity
has any “right” to file based on any notion of
home rule or local autonomy. Once a local crisis
threatens to impose costs on other entities
throughout the state, the crisis is no longer
simply a matter of local concern. Moreover, as
earlier discussed, ready access to Chapter 9
creates moral hazard problems, and uncertain
access may have some disciplining effect on local
149
officials. To the extent that timely action by
the governor may matter, it will be up to local
officials
to
coordinate
with
the
governor’s
office, making sure that the governor is up to
speed on the issues, so that he may make timely
decisions as necessary. A municipal filing should
always require some affirmative authorization from
the state.
(3) Guidelines Concerning Discretion

It may be advisable in the authorizing statute
to include guidelines for the governor’s exercise
of discretion. The authorizing statute might
describe factors for the governor to consider or
particular agencies to consult, depending on the
type of municipal entity.
For example, the
superintendent of schools would be a useful
adviser to the governor concerning the possible
bankruptcy filing for a school district. Perhaps
the superintendent’s concurrence in the governor’s
grant
of
bankruptcy
authorization
should
be
150
required as well.
This sort of “authority149. See supra Part III[C][1].
150. Under current law, the state-appointed administrator for a
distressed school district must approve the school district’s
bankruptcy filing. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 41325 (1999). See also
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sharing”
arrangement
would
depend
on
the
particular type of municipality at issue, but in
any event should at a minimum require the
governor’s affirmative authorization.
Pennsylvania’s authorizing statute for large
cities provides an example. It describes the
process by which the governor must exercise
discretion with respect to a city contemplating a
municipal filing, including particular agencies
with which the governor must consult:
(1) When any such petition shall be submitted
to the Governor for approval, accompanied with a
proposed plan of readjustment of the debts of a
city, the Governor shall make a careful and
thorough investigation of the financial condition
of such city, of its assets and liabilities, of
its sinking fund, and whether the affairs thereof
are managed in a careful, prudent and economic
manner in order
to ascertain whether
the
presentation of such petition is justified, or
represents an unjust attempt by such city to
evade payment of
some of its
contractual
obligations, and, if the Governor believes that
such petition should be approved, whether the
plan of readjustment submitted will be helpful to
the financial condition of the city and is
feasible and, at the same time, fair and
equitable to all creditors.
(2) The Governor shall also, prior to giving his
approval, ascertain the amount, if any, of the
obligations of any such petitioning city which is
held by any agency or agencies of the State
government as trust funds and shall, before
approving
any
such
petition
and
plan
of
readjustment, consult with and give every such
agency an opportunity to be heard and the
privilege to examine the findings of the Governor
resulting from the investigation hereinbefore
required to be made, and shall likewise hear any
other creditor of such city, whether resident in
or outside of this Commonwealth, who shall apply
therefor.
(3)
The Governor, if he approves a petition,
shall, before giving his approval, require such
In re Richmond Unified School Dist., 133 B.R. 221 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1991) (granting Chapter 9 debtor’s motion to dismiss case
after state school superintendent appointed administrator to
govern school district).
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modification in the proposed plan for readjusting
the debts as to him appear proper.151

Providing
guidelines
would
be
politically
useful as well, making clear that the governor’s
discretion is not unfettered. On the other hand,
guidelines that are too elaborate might hobble the
system, either requiring excessive investigation
by the governor before making a decision or
creating the possibility of litigation over the
governor’s compliance with the guidelines. The
right balance will be important.
(4) Conditions to Filing:
Oversight

Financial and Operational

As the state officer empowered to authorize a
municipal bankruptcy filing, the governor should
also be given the power to attach conditions to
152
Certain conditions may be
any authorization.
appropriate in order to facilitate a prompt
resolution of the crisis and to mitigate the
statewide impact of a filing. Several states have
enacted fairly elaborate nonbankruptcy approaches
to municipal distress, with varying degrees of
oversight and control over municipal affairs
during the pendency of the crisis. For our
purposes, similar provisions could be included as
“off-the-rack” options for the governor to attach
as conditions to an authorization for a bankruptcy
filing.
Conditions
could
range
from
the
governor’s prebankruptcy approval of a proposed
plan of adjustment to the governor’s appointment
of a trustee to manage the municipality’s affairs
during the pendency of the bankruptcy case.
In Michigan, if evidence exists of a “serious
financial problem” with a local government, the
governor may appoint a “review team” to make an
153
The review team is empowered not
assessment.
151. 53 PA. STAT. § 12720.211(C) (1999).
152. For a thorough discussion of the legal basis for the
state’s imposition of conditions to authorization, see AMY CHANG,
MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: STATE AUTHORIZATION UNDER THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CODE
(Pub. Law Research Inst., Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of the
Law,
Working
Paper
Series
(Fall
1995)),
available
at
www.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/muniban.html.
153. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1213 (1999).
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only to investigate the local government entity,
but also, if necessary, to negotiate a consent
agreement with the local government concerning
154
long-range plans for financial recovery.
If a
consent agreement is not obtained or the local
government subsequently fails to comply, then the
governor may declare a financial emergency and
basically
effect
a
takeover
of
the
local
155
government by an emergency financial manager.
The emergency financial manager has authority to
place the local government in bankruptcy if
attempts to adopt and implement a feasible
156
financial plan fail.
While these nonbankruptcy municipal crisis
management structures may be a bit more elaborate
than California may need or want, they provide
useful models of state management from which to
borrow. Resort to these devices could be done
contemporaneously with an authorization to file
bankruptcy.
Without
limiting
the
governor’s
discretion to tailor conditions to particular
circumstances, I propose three basic “off-therack” conditions—and
one
variation—that
might
be useful.
(a) Option 1

The most aggressive condition that the governor
could attach to a bankruptcy authorization would
be his appointment of a trustee to manage the

154. The agreement may provide for remedial measures considered
necessary
including
a
long-range
financial
recovery
plan
requiring specific local actions. The agreement may utilize state
financial management and technical assistance as necessary in
order to alleviate the local financial problem. The agreement may
also provide for periodic fiscal status reports to the state
treasurer. In order for the consent agreement to go into effect,
it shall be approved, by resolution, by the governing body of the
local government
Id. § 141.1214.
155. The governor shall “assign the responsibility for managing
the local government financial emergency to the local emergency
financial assistance loan board,” which appoints an emergency
financial manager. Id. § 141.1218(1).
156. This decision to file bankruptcy is subject to veto by the
local emergency financial assistance loan board. See id. §
141.1222.
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municipality’s
affairs,
including
plan
formulation, for the duration of the case. This
condition should probably be reserved only for
157
serious cases of financial mismanagement.
The option to appoint a trustee should also be
available to the governor for the duration of any
ongoing bankruptcy case, in case the debtor fails
to comply with other, earlier conditions to
authorization as described below. Because no
well-defined
mechanism
exists
to
revoke
a
municipal
debtor’s
previously
granted
state
authorization, the state may need to resort to
appointment of a trustee in order to enforce its
conditions or to dismiss a bankruptcy proceeding
that the state deems is no longer advisable.
(b) Option 1A

A less intrusive precondition to bankruptcy
authorization would be appointment of a trustee
with the sole responsibility of formulating the
plan. Municipal operations would continue to be
managed by local officials, while the trustee
focused on creditor negotiations. Failure of
local officials to cooperate with the trustee with
respect to plan formulation might result in
158
expanded powers for the trustee.
(c) Option 2

This approach is less aggressive than Option 1,

157. Because of the intrusiveness of this condition, perhaps its
use should require the governor to obtain the concurrence of the
state treasurer or another state official. However, the benefits
of including restraints on the governor’s discretion should be
carefully weighed against the possible costs of deadlock.
Imagine, for example, that the governor refuses to authorize
bankruptcy without appointment of a trustee, but the state
treasurer refuses to concur in that precondition. The governor,
the state treasurer, and municipal officials would then be locked
in a sort of triangular negotiation, with possibilities for
political opportunism all around.
158. Pennsylvania’s approach for general municipal
distress
takes a similar approach. Upon the filing of a petition, a plan
coordinator is appointed to formulate the plan. See 53 PA. STAT.
§ 11701.262(C) (1999). The municipal debtor’s failure to
cooperate with the coordinator can result in suspension of state
funding to the municipality. See id. § 11701.264.
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but would allow the governor to monitor the case
quite closely. It would require that a plan of
adjustment
be
submitted
for
the
governor’s
approval along with the request for bankruptcy
authorization.
Authorization
could
then
be
conditioned on the filing of the governor-approved
plan either contemporaneously with the filing of
the bankruptcy petition or before some specified
deadline date. The governor could (a) reserve the
right to approve any modification to the plan, and
(b) set a deadline for plan confirmation as well.
A post-filing violation of these conditions could
trigger the governor’s appointment of a trustee,
either to take control of the plan formulation
process or to manage the municipal debtor in
general.
(d) Option 3

The least intrusive approach would be for the
governor
to
authorize
the
filing,
and
set
deadlines for the filing and confirmation of a
plan of adjustment. Failure to meet
either
deadline could result in appointment of a trustee.
There is legislative precedent in California
for these approaches, and in particular for
reliance on the trustee mechanism. With a series
of bills, the legislature approved the diversion
of infrastructure funds to the Orange County
general fund to enable the county to fund a
159
bankruptcy plan. With SB 1276, the legislature
added a “back-up mechanism” to “guarantee that
the county will be able to prepare and obtain
confirmation
of
an
acceptable
plan
of
160
This
back-up
mechanism
was
the
adjustment.”
possible appointment of a state trustee at the
discretion of the governor if the county had not
161
filed a plan by January 1, 1996. Further, if the
governor determined that timely confirmation of a
plan appeared unlikely by May 1, 1996, then

159. See BALDASSARE, supra note 1, at 167-68 (describing series of
bills—AB 1664, SB 863, SB 1276 and SB 727—that effected funding
of Orange County plan).
160. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 30400(b).
161. See id. § 30401(a).

52

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53
162

appointment of a trustee was required.
The
trustee, if appointed, was broadly authorized to
act for the county, exercising all powers of the
163
board of supervisors.
C. Negotiated Resolution

The structure described above anticipates that
state and local officials will discuss possible
conditions to bankruptcy authorization prior to
any formal authorization request. For example,
the governor might wish to appoint a trustee, but
the municipality might oppose. As I envision the
structure, the governor could not impose a trustee
simply based on a municipality’s application for
authorization, but may require it as a condition
to filing. The municipality would be free to
reject the governor’s bankruptcy authorization and
attached conditions by deciding not to file for
bankruptcy, and the conditions to authorization
would never go into effect.
This approach gives the municipality some
measure of local sovereignty and yet encourages it
to
explore
the
bankruptcy
option
with
the
governor. While this may ultimately result in a
standoff
between
the
governor
and
the
municipality, hopefully they would be able to
164
This model of
reach a negotiated arrangement.
negotiated management of financial crisis follows
other
states’
nonbankruptcy
mechanisms
for
resolution of municipal distress. As previously
described, Michigan’s “review team” appointed by
the governor is empowered to negotiate a consent
agreement with a distressed local government

162. See id.
163. See id. § 30402. Because of the unusual circumstance that
many creditors were also municipal entities, the trustee was also
authorized to act on behalf of these cities, public districts,
and other governmental agencies with claims against the county,
to the extent necessary to prevent denial of confirmation of a
plan of adjustment. See id. § 30405.
164. Possible legislative action would always be available to
resolve a deadlock, either by authorizing the governor to appoint
a trustee regardless of any bankruptcy filing, or by granting
special authorization for the municipality to file, or something
in between.
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concerning
a
recovery
plan.
Pennsylvania’s
Intergovernmental
Cooperation
Authority
is
authorized
to
negotiate
“intergovernmental
cooperation agreements” with cities in need of
assistance, and general assistance may not be
166
provided unless such an agreement is in effect.
In contrast to these elaborate nonbankruptcy
schemes,
my
proposal
is
less
formal,
less
elaborate, and less aggressive than these other
state systems. Because it is based on bankruptcy
authorization, the system I propose is formally
triggered only by a municipal entity’s application
for bankruptcy authorization and its subsequent
bankruptcy filing. By contrast, some states’
municipal
distress
systems
include
objective
triggers of financial distress that enable early
unilateral state intervention. I believe a more
informal approach is appropriate for California.
States that have elaborate state intervention
provisions,
like
Michigan
and
Pennsylvania,
typically anticipated multiple municipal crises as
a result of general economic downturns and
declining tax bases in their respective regions.
Without prompt and active intervention by the
state, successive municipal crises could have had
167
In California,
severe statewide ramifications.
by contrast, municipal financial distress is quite
rare,
especially
for
general
purpose
municipalities.
D. The Politics of Legislating Discretionary Access

This distinction between California’s situation
and those of states like Michigan and Pennsylvania
suggests a final issue worth mentioning: the
politics of legislating a discretionary access
approach. Consistent with earlier discussion on
the politics of state involvement in municipal
165. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
166. See 53 PA. STAT. § 12720.203(D) (1999).
167. See generally COPING WITH FISCAL DISTRESS, supra note 118
(focusing on six distressed Pennsylvania municipalities—three
cities and three boroughs—that became financially distressed in
the three years following implementation of the Financially
Distressed Municipalities Act (Act 47 of 1987), and commenting on
efficacy of that act).
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distress, the crafting of a more active role for
the state in the affairs of financially distressed
municipalities may face opposition from municipal
entities and indifference from state officials.
Even for a financially healthy municipality, its
local
officials
may
find
unappealing
the
possibility of an increased role for the state in
the case of its hypothetical financial distress.
State officials as well may be unenthusiastic
about the prospect of early involvement in
managing local distress situations.
However, each municipality, while concerned for
its
own
autonomy,
must
also
consider
the
consequences of autonomy for other municipalities
in the state. Because a healthy municipality may
be
adversely
affected
by
another
municipal
entity’s financial mismanagement or misfortunes,
municipalities might favor legislating some system
of active state involvement in municipal distress.
Especially in states facing statewide economic
crisis, healthy local entities may support state
intervention
in
the
affairs
of
distressed
entities. A healthy entity has much to lose in
that context without state intervention to stem
the crisis. State officials likewise may have no
choice in that situation but to assert an active
role.
Moreover,
the
specter
of
once-pending
statewide financial crisis may go a long way
toward explaining the existence of provisions for
aggressive state intervention in other states.
California currently faces no such crisis.
Legislating a more active role for the state—even
the relatively minor amendment of requiring the
governor’s authorization for a Chapter 9 filing—
may therefore fail to attract instant political
support. Ironically, however, the absence of any
imminent financial emergency may offer an ideal
environment for careful consideration of such
legislation.
Deliberation
removed
from
the
passions of an immediate crisis may produce a
better system of state authorization—one that
better
accounts
for
statewide
interests—than
case-specific
legislation
forged
under
time
168. See supra Part III[B].
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pressure in the face of catastrophe.

V. Some Issues Concerning the Scope and
Definition of “Municipality”
As earlier discussed, only a municipality—a
“political
subdivision
or
public
agency
or
169
instrumentality of a State” —is eligible for
Chapter 9. In the course of discussion over
California’s
state
authorization
scheme,
particular questions have been raised concerning
the scope and clarity of this federal definition,
and whether a state authorization scheme may
account for such issues. In this part, I consider
these questions.
A. A State Law Definition of “Municipality”

Noting
possible
ambiguity
in
the
U.S.
bankruptcy law definition, some have suggested
that a state authorization statute for Chapter 9
should
include
a
state
law
definition
of
“municipality” or an enumeration of entities that
170
This
comes
in
the
wake
of
the
qualify.
controversial bankruptcy court decision in Orange
County finding that OCIP was not a municipality
under the federal statute and therefore not
171
A state law definition
eligible for Chapter 9.
or list of public entities might be useful in
indicating to a bankruptcy court what California
considers a “public agency or instrumentality” of
the state. In particular, a state law provision
might at the margin encourage a bankruptcy court
to construe Chapter 9 access more liberally than
172
it otherwise would.
This approach has some promise but also some
limitations. On the positive side, it makes sense

169. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1994).
170. See Memorandum from Henry C. Kevane, partner, Pachulski
Stang Ziehl Young & Jones, to Randall Henry, Office of Senator
Quentin L. Kopp at 3 (May 31, 1996) (on file with the California
Law Revision Commission).
171. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
172. Presumably, resort to a state law definition would be
unnecessary if the point were to narrow access to Chapter 9,
since the state can do that anyway through its authorizing power.
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for the state to want to broaden the definition of
“municipality” as much as possible, since the
state
can
always
limit
access
through
its
authorizing power. A state agency should not be
denied access to Chapter 9 simply because it has a
novel
purpose
that
may
not
comport
with
traditional municipal functions.
On the other hand, technically, only the
federal definition matters.
That
definition
cannot be expanded by state legislation, any more
than
any
federal
statute
is
subject
to
modification by a state legislature. No state can
expand the availability of Chapter 9 by redefining
the term “municipality.” Regardless of any state
law definition, it will ultimately always be up to
a bankruptcy court to decide whether a particular
debtor qualifies under federal law. A state law
definition might be informative and persuasive to
a bankruptcy court judge, but it cannot rewrite
federal law.
A list approach may be more effective. It
would not redefine terms contained in the federal
statute, but would merely provide a reference for
the bankruptcy judge in her attempts to construe
the terms “political subdivision” and “public
agency or instrumentality” from federal law and
decide whether a particular state-created entity
qualifies. For example, some manifestation by the
state
that
it
considers
a
county-created
investment
pool
to
be
a
state
agency
or
instrumentality might be persuasive.
This approach has limits, of course. It would
be useful only when the entity at issue has some
plausible claim to being a public entity. A
private firm would not qualify, regardless of any
state law spin.
B. Nonprofit Corporations

A question has been raised as to whether a
nonprofit corporation that administers government173
funded programs may be eligible for Chapter 9.
173. See Stan Ulrich, Bankruptcy Code: Chapter 9 Issues, Staff
Memorandum 97-19, California Law Revision Commission, at 7 (March
22, 1997).
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Given that some or all of the assets of the
nonprofit are either restricted grant funds or
assets purchased with such funds, the basic
concern is that the granting government agency be
able to recover the assets, instead of having them
174
used to satisfy the claims of general creditors.
The short answer to this inquiry is two-fold.
First, nonprofit corporations generally do not
qualify as municipalities, even if their sole
activity
is
administering
government-funded
programs. Therefore, they are ineligible for
Chapter 9. Second, concerns of the granting
government agencies can adequately be addressed in
Chapter 11, for which nonprofit corporations are
clearly eligible.
The basic statutory hurdle for such entities
with respect to Chapter 9 is that because they are
private
entities,
as
opposed
to
government
entities, they will generally fail to qualify as
municipalities.
What distinguishes a
public
entity from a private one is that a public entity
is
subject
to
the
control
of
some
public
175
authority.
A
nonprofit
corporation
will
generally fail this test. While its grant funds
may be subject to government control in the sense
that uses of the funds are typically restricted by
the terms of the applicable grants, that type of
contractual restriction imposed by the government
does not change the essentially private character
of the corporation. Nonprofit corporations are
ordinarily
formed
and
controlled
by
private
parties,
not
governmental
entities.
Their
174. Telephone Interview with Colin W. Wied, Esq., former
commissioner and chairperson, California Law Revision Commission
(Mar. 7, 2000).
175. See In re Westport Transit District, 165 B.R. 93, 95 (D.
Conn. 1994) (ultimately dismissing petition because municipal
entity was not authorized to file); In re Ellicott School
Building Authority, 150 B.R. 261, 264 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992); In
re Greene County Hospital, 59 B.R. 388, 389 (S.D. Miss. 1986)
(citing Ex parte York County Natural Gas Authority, 238 F. Supp.
th
964, 976 (W.D. S.C. 1965), modified, 362 F.2d 78 (4 Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 970 (1966)). In Greene County Hospital,
the court found that because a hospital was subject to control by
a county board of supervisors, it qualified as a public agency.
Greene County Hospital, 59 B.R. at 390.
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managers
and
directors
are
private
parties.
Contracting
with
a
government
entity
cannot
transform the private entity into a public one.
The
special
protections
from
federal
court
interference that Chapter 9 affords to municipal
debtors are unnecessary for private corporations,
176
which do not raise Tenth Amendment concerns.
Moreover, the use of a nonprofit for quasigovernmental purposes is sometimes driven by a
desire to avoid certain state law restrictions
that might apply to public agencies. The only
published decision specifically addressed to this
issue
is
In
re
Ellicott
School
Building
177
Authority, which involved a nonprofit corporation
whose main purpose was to engage in a lease
financing arrangement for a school building. The
debtor
nonprofit
corporation
was
formed
to
finance, construct, and own a school building that
it would lease to Colorado School District 22.
The debtor financed its land acquisition and
178
Use of a
construction with two bond issues.
nonprofit corporation to issue the bonds was
necessary in order to avoid state law requirements
concerning voter approval for tax increases.
Voters in the school district had earlier defeated
a bond proposal that would have authorized a tax
179
increase to finance the new school building. The
debtor’s articles of incorporation required that
the debtor’s directors be residents of the school
district, but not elected officials or employees
of the school district. The apparent purpose of
this latter restriction was to assure that the
nonprofit would not be considered the alter ego of
the school district, and the debt would not be
considered municipal debt subject to state law
180
Given this structuring and the
restrictions.
point of forming the nonprofit in the first place,
it would have been ironic if the debtor nonprofit
176. See supra Part I.
177. 150 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
178. The bonds were secured by a mortgage on the land and
improvements and an assignment of the lease between the debtor
and the school district. See id. at 262.
179. See id. at 263.
180. See id. at 264.
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had subsequently been permitted to claim status as
a public agency and avail itself of Chapter 9.
While nonprofit corporations will not generally
be eligible for Chapter 9, they are eligible for
Chapter 11 reorganization—without the need for
181
any state authorization —and are accorded some
advantages over their for-profit counterparts.
Creditors cannot involuntarily place a nonprofit
182
A nonprofit
corporate debtor into bankruptcy.
corporation’s Chapter 11 case cannot be converted
183
to a Chapter 7 liquidation without its consent.
Perhaps
most
important
for
a
nonprofit
administering
government-funded
programs,
the
government funds may not necessarily be subject to
creditors’
claims.
To
the
extent
that
the
government grants restrict the debtor’s uses of
grant funds, the debtor may be deemed merely “an
agent to carry out specified tasks” for the
184
185
The case of Joliet-Will
County
grantor.
involved grants that imposed “minute controls” on
186
the use of government funds. The recipient had
very little discretion:
Each grant contains a budget specifying the items
for which costs chargeable to the grant may be
incurred and the amount that may be charged for
each item. The grantee may not switch unused
funds between items, and although he has title to
any personal property bought with grant moneys he
must
reconvey
to
the
government,
if
the
government tells him to, every piece of property
costing $1,000 or more. In these circumstances,
the grantee’s ownership is nominal, like a
trustee’s.187

As such, the debtor is not a borrower from the
granting agency but a trustee for the agency’s
funds.
The funds are not the debtor’s property
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
182. See id. § 303(a). The Code does not specifically use the
term “nonprofit.”
Instead, a nonprofit corporation is “a
corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation.” Id.
183. See id. § 1112(c).
184. In re Joliet-Will County Community Action Agency, 847 F.2d
430, 432 (7th Cir. 1988).
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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and are therefore not subject to creditors’
claims. Instead, they are assets of the granting
agencies,
which
can
recover
them
out
of
188
bankruptcy.

Conclusion
I have proposed a discretionary system of state
authorization
that
balances
(a) the
state’s
interest in its financial health and the financial
health
of
its
various
municipalities
with
(b) individual municipalities’ interests in local
autonomy.
California’s
authorization
statute
should place discretion with the governor
to
decide whether and under what conditions a
municipality
may
file
for
bankruptcy.
His
discretion should not be unlimited, but should be
subject to guidelines that may vary depending on
the type of municipality involved.
By
using
bankruptcy
authorization
as
a
triggering mechanism for state involvement
in
local financial distress, I hope to encourage
early
interaction
between
local
and
state
officials and ultimately a cooperative approach to
resolving local distress.

188. See id.

